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Abstract—Search and recommendation systems are ubiquitous
and irreplaceable tools in our daily lives. Despite their critical
role in selecting and ranking the most relevant information, they
typically do not consider the veracity of information presented
to the user. In this paper, we introduce an audit methodology
to investigate the extent of misinformation presented in search
results and recommendations on online marketplaces. We in-
vestigate the factors and personalization attributes that influence
the amount of misinformation in searches and recommendations.
Recently, several media reports criticized Amazon for hosting and
recommending items that promote misinformation on topics such
as vaccines. Motivated by those reports, we apply our algorithmic
auditing methodology on Amazon to verify those claims. Our
audit study investigates (a) factors that might influence the search
algorithms of Amazon and (b) personalization attributes that
contribute to amplifying the amount of misinformation recom-
mended to users in their search results and recommendations.
Our audit study collected ∼526k search results and ∼182k
homepage recommendations, with ∼8.5k unique items. Each
item is annotated for its stance on vaccines’ misinformation
(pro, neutral or anti). Our study reveals that (1) the selection
and ranking by the default Featured search algorithm of search
results that have misinformation stances are positively correlated
with the stance of search queries and customers’ evaluation
of items (ratings and reviews), (2) misinformation stances of
search results are neither affected by users’ activities nor by
interacting (browsing, wish-listing, shopping) with items that have
a misinformation stance, and (3) a filter bubble built-in users’
homepages have a misinformation stance positively correlated
with the misinformation stance of items that a user interacts
with.
Index Terms—misinformation, search engines, recommenda-
tion systems, personalization, conspiracies, vaccine controversies
I. INTRODUCTION
People depend on search and recommendation systems to
look for information and make decisions without understand-
ing how the algorithms that operate these systems work [1].
Recently, Amazon – one of the largest online marketplaces –
has been critiqued by several mainstream media for hosting
and recommending items that deliberately present misleading
information about vaccination [2], [3]. Vaccines’ misinforma-
tion significantly increases the rates of vaccine hesitancy [4],
which is declared by the World Health Organization (WHO)
as one of the main 10 threats to global health in 2019 [5].
Personalization is an integral part of almost every search
and recommendation system, where presented information
is tailored to users based on personalization attributes (e.g.,
users’ demographics and user-system history).
In this work, we present a methodology to study the
prevalence of algorithmically curated misinformative search
results and recommendations in online marketplaces. This is
done by systematically examining the effect of personalization
on the extent of misinformation presentation. We examine how
the misinformation stance (pro, neutral and anti) of items being
browsed, added to wish list and added to cart would affect the
stance of personalized search results and recommendations.
In particular, we focus on auditing Amazon’s search and
recommendation algorithms, in order to understand how items
are presented in search results and recommendations with
respect to their stance toward vaccines’ misinformation. We
also investigate whether the platform presents misinformative
items about vaccines on search and recommendations, and the
key factors that might influence the underlying algorithms.
The key contributions of this work can be summarized as
follows: 1) We present a methodology to study the prevalence
of algorithmically curated misinformative search results and
recommendations in online marketplaces. This study is the
first to systematically examine the effect of personalization
on the extent of misinformation returned in search results and
recommendations on online marketplaces. 2) We contribute to
the research community by building a rich dataset consisting
of ∼526k search results, ∼182k homepage recommendations
and 8566 unique items annotated for their stances toward
vaccines’ misinformation, along with the personalization at-
tributes audited 1. 3) Our study revealed how personalization
leads to building a filter bubble of recommendations in a
user’s homepage. 4) Our study investigates Amazon’s default
Featured search algorithm by analyzing what factors drive
the selection and ranking of items in search results given the
items’ misinformation stance.
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The main objectives of this work is to investigate how
misinformative items get ranked and recommended to a user in
search results and recommendations, and to understand what
personalization attributes that contribute into amplifying the
amount of misinformation in search results and recommenda-
tions. To achieve those objectives we guide our research to
answer the following three research questions. Note that, we
focus on Amazon as the online marketplace platform and on
vaccines as the misinformation topic throughout this work.
RQ1 - [SEARCH ALGORITHMS]. Do search algorithms
steer users toward more misinformative search results?
What are the contributing factors? To investigate this
question, we examine three major factors that might influence
the search algorithms;
• RQ1a - Ranking Algorithm. How items with misinfor-
mation stance get ranked by the 5 search algorithms?
1Data will be published in an online public repository upon acceptance
along with a ReadMe file that describes the dataset in detail.
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• RQ1b - Search Query. Is there a correlation between
misinformation stances of search queries and search re-
sults? i.e., would pro-misinformative search queries (e.g.,
”vaccine illusion”) generate more misinformative search
results than neutral search queries (e.g., ”vaccines”)?
• RQ1c - User Rating. How the ratings of an item by users
affect its rankings in search results, given that the item
has a stance toward misinformation?
RQ2 - [USER ACTIVITY]. What is the effect of a user
activity on the amount of misinformative search results
and recommendations?
• RQ2-H. We hypothesize that the closer the user to
purchase a specific item the more similar items would
be present in search results and recommendations. Hence
adding misinformative items to a shopping cart would
generate more misinformative search results and recom-
mendations than adding the same items to the user’s wish
list. Similarly, adding misinformative items to a wish list
would generate more misinformative search results and
recommendations than just browsing these items.
RQ3 - [ITEM STANCE]. Given user history (browsed,
wished for or purchased) for an item, what is the effect
of the item stance toward misinformation on the amount
of generated misinformed search results and recommen-
dations?
• RQ3-H. We hypothesize that whenever a user inter-
acts with an item of a particular misinformation stance
(pro misinformation, neutral or anti misinformation), the
search results and recommendation would have a similar
misinformation stance.
III. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Misinformation in search results and recommendations.
Misinformation has been widely studied under various themes
including conspiracy theories [6], rumors [7], [8], hoaxes [9],
fake news [10]–[12] and information credibility [13], [14].
Most research studied misinformation in social media [15]–
[20]. Even though ∼92% of the U.S. population acquires
information through search and recommendation systems [21],
very limited research methodically inspects the algorithmic
curation of misinformative content on such systems [22], [23].
Most online users are unaware that search results and rec-
ommendations are algorithmically curated and personalized.
Some users do not know that search and recommendation sys-
tems might present inaccurate information. One study revealed
that ∼62% of Facebook users were unaware of Facebook
News Feed recommendation algorithm [1]. Another study
discovered that a significant number of YouTube users came
to believe that Earth is flat after they watched recommended
videos [24]. Another study found that searching for “vitamin
k shot” on YouTube and Google returned results discouraging
taking the vitamin shot; and some of the top 10 results
from YouTube and Google were recommending anti-vaccine
content [25]. Another study examining politically related bias
in YouTube videos showed that videos supporting Trump
promoted conspiracies and fake news about Clinton [26].
Prior work also found that content consumed through search
is usually highly trusted and can change people’s political
views and voting behaviors [27]. Algorithmically curated
and presented content has been investigated due to concerns
that algorithmically-targeted content may have influenced the
2016 U.S. election [28]. Search and recommendation systems
sometimes recommend and present biased and misinformative
content [29].
Fig. 1: Search and recommendation system components and their interdependencies.
Search and recommendation systems. Search engines
and recommendation systems are integral components of the
ecosystems of many online platforms. Algorithms that operate
these components aim to perform two key tasks: (1) search
and (2) recommend tailored content to the user. In search,
the user provides a search query and the search algorithm
selects, ranks and returns a list of relevant search results.
For selection and ranking, the algorithm utilizes additional
attributes besides the search query to tailor the search results.
Additional attributes include user demographic information
(e.g., gender, age, location) and user system history (e.g.,
previous searches, browsing history, purchase history). Rec-
ommendation algorithms usually employ one or a hybrid of
popular recommendation models [30]–[32] including content-
based and collaborative filtering models. Content-based recom-
mendation algorithms tailor recommendations based on simi-
larities (e.g., titles, descriptions, ratings, prices) between items
being recommended and items previously selected, liked or
purchased by the user. User demographics are also considered.
Collaborative filtering algorithms are similar to content-based
algorithms, but in addition, consider attitudes and preferences
of similar users (i.e., users who share similar demographics,
system-history or preferences). Recommendation algorithms
aim to curate a set of recommendations that increase user
satisfaction, sales, and subscriptions to the platform; thereby
increasing the overall platform revenue. In Fig. 1, we illustrate
a graphical representation of search and recommendation
system components and their interdependencies.
Auditing search and recommendation algorithms. Due
to the opacity of search and recommendation algorithms, they
have been commonly investigated as a black-box using algo-
rithmic auditing techniques. This involves systematic statistical
analysis of the algorithms of an online platform to detect
suspicious behavior [33]. These methods include repeatedly
querying algorithms and observing the corresponding output.
This provides an understanding of algorithms internal mechan-
ics without detailed knowledge of its internal process. Algo-
rithmic auditing has proved its efficacy in studying (a) bias
in online systems [34]–[38], (b) the extent of personalization
used by search engines [39], [40], and (c) the extent of online
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misinformation [22], [23].
Previous work attempted to investigate the prevalence of
vaccines’ misinformation on Amazon, but the study has some
limitations [23]. First, search was performed using only a
single query. Our study presented in this paper uses 29
search queries which enables the exploration of several di-
mensions within Amazon’s search space. Another limitation
of the previous study is the limited focus on a single item
type; namely, books. Moreover, the study only considered
104 books, which is a relatively small dataset. On the other
hand, our dataset is much larger (8566 unique items) and
covers several types of items (e.g., books, videos, audibles,
etc.). Another major limitation of the previous study is that
it does not investigate any personalization effect on search
and recommendation. However, our study investigates various
personalization attributes. The last limitation, the previous
study investigates only one search algorithm (Featured), while
our study investigates all five existing Amazon algorithms.
Vaccines’ misinformation and hesitancy. Vaccination is
one of the most successful methods of preventing the spread of
infectious diseases. Yet recently, increasing numbers of parents
doubt vaccines’ efficacy and safety fearing possible side effects
on children. Vaccine controversies are based on misinformed
beliefs that vaccines contain deleterious ingredients such as
Mercury and Aluminum that can lead to diseases such as
autism and sudden infant death syndrome. Some conspiracy
theories claim that the propaganda behind mandating vaccina-
tion is promoted by big pharmaceutical companies to increase
their revenues. Others claim that some diseases can be cured
alone by the human body’s immune system and therefore
vaccination is not required. Such misinformation is refuted by
WHO, other authoritative agencies, and scientific studies [41]–
[45]. Such conspiracies and pseudoscience-based claims on
vaccines lead to increasing rates of vaccine hesitancy [4].
IV. METHODOLOGY
Search queries. One of the key challenges in conducting
audit studies is the selection of search queries that are a)
related to the topic under investigation, b) most used on the
platform and c) most recently used to search for that topic.
We build on our recently published query selection method-
ology [22] to identify high impact search queries related to
the topic of vaccine controversies. Our goal is to curate a set
of search queries that satisfies two requirements: (1) include
search queries that are most used to search for information
about vaccines controversies, and (2) include search queries
that are most recently used by users on Amazon. To meet
these requirements we collect queries from two sources: a)
Google Trends; where we generate analytics about the topic
of ”Vaccine Controversies” (see fig. 2b) and get a list of
the top related queries that we include to our query list. b)-
Amazon search box (see fig. 2a); where we feed seed queries
(vaccine(s), vaccination) and collect a list of auto-complete
query suggestions generated by Amazon. This list represents
the most recently used queries by Amazon users. We add those
queries to our query list. Later, we follow a set of heuristics to
shortlist our query list in order to remove redundant queries,
semantically similar queries (e.g., “vaccines” and “vaccine”)
and longer queries (length>4 words) that are overtly specific
(e.g., “vaccines did not cause Rachel’s autism”). Our final
query set consists of 29 queries that represent the most high
impact search queries. We annotate each of the 29 search
queries for the stance of its expected search results toward vac-
cines’ misinformation, for example, query ”vaccine illusion”
is annotated with 1 (pro misinfo) since the expected search
results for that query would be vaccines’ misinformative.
Another example, query ”vaccine” would be annotated with
0 (neutral) since the expected search results would be neutral
to vaccines’ misinformation. Check the queries curation and
annotation algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Search queries curation algorithm
Result: query set; Set of most related, used and recent annotated queries
// top related queries by Google Trends
query set = GoogleTrends.TopQueries(topic=Vaccine Controversies);
// most recently used queries in Amazon
query set += AmazonSearchBox(seeds=[vaccine(s), vaccination]);
// follow heuristics to shortlist query set
query set -= {redundant queries, semantically similar queries, longer queries,
overtly specific queries};
foreach query q ∈ query set do
if expected results(q) are pro-misinfo then
annotate(q, +1);
else if expected results(q) are anti-misinfo then
annotate(q, -1);
else
annotate(q, 0);
end
end
Annotation. We ran our audit experiment repeatedly for
14 consecutive days and collected ∼526k items in search
results including 6870 unique items, and ∼182k recommenda-
tions from homepages including 1762 unique items. Together,
search and recommendation data include a total of 8566 unique
items. To develop proper annotation heuristics for our datasets,
we randomly sampled 100 items and manually annotated them
by three different individuals separately. After iterations of
discussions, we developed the following annotation heuristics
and classes:
• Items related to vaccination are given values of -1, 0 or
1, where items that promote vaccines’ misinformation
or discourage vaccination are annotated with 1, items
that oppose, debunk or mock vaccines’ misinformation
or encourage vaccination are given -1, and items that are
neutral will be given a value of 0.
• Items not related to the topic of vaccination will be give
a value of 2, items presented in a foreign language than
English will be given 3, and items that were removed
from Amazon after data collection will be given a value
of 4.
Next to agreeing on the annotation classes and heuristics, one
person annotated all of the 8566 unique items. To quantify
the amount of misinformation, annotation values given to each
class are normalized. The goal of normalizing the annotation
stances is to calculate the amount of misinformation on a
Search Engine Results Page (SERP) or a homepage on a scale
from -1 (all items against misinformation) to +1 (all items are
pro misinformation). This informs the decision on whether a
personalization attribute leads to more or less misinformative
search results or recommendations. This fine grained 6-point
scale system is then mapped into a 3-point scale system (-1, 0
and 1). Annotation values -1, 0 and 1 remain the same after the
normalization. Annotation value 2 is mapped to 0, and items
annotated as 3 or 4 are ignored. Table II shows the description,
heuristics, normalized scores, counts and examples of each
annotation class.
Misinformation Score of a SERP. We measure the extent
of misinformation in each of the saved SERPs using the SERP
3
Stance TreatmentActivity No. ofaccounts Pro Misinfo Neutral Anti Misinfo Mix
Browse 4 1 1 1 1
Add to wish list 4 1 1 1 1
Add to cart 4 1 1 1 1
Search 1
TABLE I: 13 accounts created to execute the audit experiment, where 12 accounts
will perform the 3 activities (browse, add to list and add to cart) on the 4 stance treatments
(3X4) and 1 account created to solely search without having history at 11am along with
the other 12 accounts.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: (a) List of Amazon’s auto-complete suggestions when the seed query
“vaccines” fed into the search box at the top of Amazon’s page, (b) Top related queries
used to search in the Vaccine Controversies topic in Google Trends.
Misinformation Score (SERP-MS) [22]2, which computes the
amount of misinformation in a SERP while considering the
SERP ranking of results. A SERP-MS ranges from -1 (all
search results oppose misinformation) to +1 (all search results
promote misinformation).
Misinformation Score of a Recommendation page. In
Amazon, a user’s homepage is composed of items recom-
mended inside components. Each component contains a set
of items that are both (a) ranked horizontally and (b) belong
to the same recommendation heuristic (e.g., ”Related to items
you’ve viewed”, ”Inspired by your shopping trends”). A SERP
composed of results combined horizontally and vertically is
called a federated SERP [46]. We develop a new score based
on SERP-MS called FSERP-MS (Federated SERP Misin-
formation Score) that does a similar job by measuring the
misinformation in a page by considering both (a) the rank of
the component in the page and (b) the rank of the item within
the component. Equation 1 shows the FSERP-MS formula;
where r is the rank of a recommendation within a component,
n is the number of recommendations inside a component, i
is the rank of a component inside the federated SERP and m
is the number of components in a federated SERP. FSERP-
MS is a continuous value ranging from -1 (all items in all
components are oppose misinformation) to +1 (all items in all
components promote misinformation).
FSERP −MS =
∑m
i=1[(
∑n
r=1 (xr∗(n−r+1))
n∗(n+1)
2
) ∗ (m− i+ 1)]
m∗(m+1)
2
(1)
V. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We demonstrate our experimental design and execution to
answer the research questions mentioned in sec. II. In our
experiments we collect search results and recommendations
from two different Amazon pages: (a) User’s homepage: We
2SERP-MS =
∑n
r=1 (xr∗(n−r+1))
n∗(n+1)
2
; where r is the rank of the search result
and n is the number of search results present in the SERP
(a) Amazon SERP (b) Amazon Homepage
Fig. 3: (a) An Amazon SERP generated when searching for “vaccines”, (b) An
Amazon homepage of three recommendation components.
collect the first 20 recommendations from each recommenda-
tion component that exists on the user’s homepage on Amazon,
fig. 3b show three components on a homepage, where each
component has a rank on the homepage and recommending
no. of items, (b) Amazon SERP: we collect the first 20 search
results recommended by Amazon’s search algorithm when a
user searches for a query, fig 3a shows an example of an
Amazon SERP.
Measured personalization attributes. We design our audit
experiment to measure the amount of personalized misin-
formative search results and recommendations generated by
Amazon. We audit the effect of personalization caused by the
following two attributes:
• Activities performed by user on Amazon, where we study
the effect of four main activities: 1)- search: user searches
Amazon for the 29 queries 2)- browse: user opens the
page of an item and browses its content, 3)- add to wish
list: user browses the page of an item and adds that item
to his/her wish list by clicking on the “Add to list” button
and 4)- add to cart: user browses the page of an item and
adds it to his/her shopping cart by clicking on the “Add to
cart” button. All activities and histories that each activity
builds with the system are shown in table III.
• Stance of an item toward vaccines’ misinformation (pro-
mote, neutral and oppose misinformation about vaccines).
First we search each of the 29 search queries and collect
the first 20 search results from their respective SERPs,
some queries return fewer results (358 unique results in
total), then we annotate each item in the set of unique
search results with regard to its stance toward vaccines’
misinformation. Next, we select the top 12 most rated
items under each stance into three sets that represent the
three stances. From those three sets, we create 4 items
stance treatments to measure the effect of the item’s
stance as shown in table IV. We end up having four
different stance treatments: Pro treatment that contains
12 most rated items that have misinformative stance
toward vaccines. Neutral treatment that contains 12 most
rated items that have a neutral stance toward vaccines.
Anti treatment that contains 12 most rated items that
oppose vaccines’ misinformation or promote vaccines.
And finally Mix treatment that contains 4 from each of
the 3 other treatments, we mix those 12 items randomly.
Refer to table II for heuristics and samples of the three
main stances (with annotation values of -1, 0 or 1).
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Annota-
tion Value Description Annotation Heuristics
No. of
unique items
Normali-
zed Score
Sample items
(Title, URL [amazon.com/dp/asin])
-1
opposing, debunking or mocking
misinformation about vaccines
or promoting vaccines
(1) refutes, disapprove or mocks misinformation about vaccines
(2) gives authoritative evidence that proves vaccines’ safety or
efficacy (3) has a positive stance on vaccines
search (524)
recommend (25) -1
Vaccines: What Every Parent
Should Know, asin=0028638611
0 neutral Item that does not have a positive or negative stance towardvaccines
search (433)
recommend (13) 0
Vaccines and Autoimmunity,
asin=B014T25FX6
1
promoting, supporting or
explaining misinformation
about vaccines
(1) promotes, supports or adduces misinformation on vaccines
(2) promotes delaying or stopping vaccination or has a negative
stance on vaccines
search (419)
recommend (60) 1
A Shot in the Dark,
asin=089529463X
2 Not about vaccines Item that is not related to vaccination search (5464)recommend (1658) 0
PlayStation 4 Slim 1TB Console,
asin=B071CV8CG2
3 Non English Item that has its title, description or contentsin a non-English language
search (25)
recommend (0) ignored
TETYANA OBUKHANYCH -
I VACCINI, asin=8893195445
4 Removed Item removed from Amazon at the time ofannotation
search (5)
recommend (6) ignored
Indica Plateau Don’t Confuse
Your Search ..., asin=B07ZMJNJQ7
TABLE II: Description and heuristics of each annotation class along with no. of unique items in search results and recommendations, normalized score and a sample item.
Activity User History
Search Search history
Browse Browsing history
Add to wish list Browsing history + Wish history
Add to cart Browsing history + Purchase history
TABLE III: List of activities performed by Amazon accounts and history built by
each user action.
Treatment name Selection Criteria
Anti Misinformation 12 most rated items opposing vaccines’ misinformation
Neutral 12 most rated items that are neutral toward vaccines
Pro Misinformation 12 most rated items promoting vaccines’ misinformation
Mix 12 items randomly mixed from the top 4 most rated itemsfrom each stance (4 pro + 4 neutral + 4 anti)
TABLE IV: List of items stance treatments used to measure the effect of an item’s
stance toward vaccines’ misinformation (Pro, Neutral or Anti)
Controlled personalization attributes. We control for the
personalization effects stemming form user’s demographics
(age, gender and location), because Amazon do not enable
their users to set their age or gender during the sign-up process
or through their Amazon accounts settings. Also, Amazon
provides different methods to set the location of a user, for
example an Amazon account could have different shipping
addresses, and users also can set their locations through
their accounts settings, in addition to the geographic location
inferred from a user’s IP address. That’s why we control for
the user’s location by (1) executing our audit experiment for
each Amazon account from the same location (Mountain View,
CA), (2) configuring the location of each Amazon account to
Mountain View, CA and (3) not adding any shipment address
to any account.
Controlling for noise. In audit studies, noise could sig-
nificantly affect search results and recommendations. For
example, temporal noise attributed to regular updates of search
indices could affect the returned search results if not con-
trolled. During the execution of our audit experiment, we
control for different sources of noise, for example we control
for browser noise by selecting the same version of Mozilla
Firefox for all accounts where cookies are enabled and every
browser history is cleaned daily before the execution of the
experiment. We also control for temporal effect by performing
all activities and searches for all accounts simultaneously. In
addition, we control for the machines used in the experiment
by having every machine configured similarly (Ubuntu 14.04,
same generation of CPU and 3.75GB RAM), controlling for
the machine configuration assures that no noise results from
using different speeds of CPUs, different sizes of memory
or varying performance due to different Operating Systems.
Carry-over noise happens when a search operation affects the
Fig. 4: Steps taken by accounts that perform the four activities (Search, Browse, add
to wish list and add to cart).
search results of the next search in two successive searches.
Previous audit studies on Google Search showed that carry-
over noise is noticed if the time between two successive
searches is less than 11 minutes [39]. We use this as the
benchmark and decide to keep a time interval of 20 minutes
between two successive searches to control for noise from
carry-over effects.
Auditing steps. In order to measure the effects of user’s
activities and item’s misinformation stance on Amazon search
results and recommendation we designed the audit experiment
as follows; we create a total of 13 Amazon accounts that
are automated by Selenium scripts as follows ; 12 Amazon
accounts where each will perform one of the last three
activities shown in table III on one of the stance treatments
shown in table IV. We also create 1 Amazon account to
solely search Amazon without having any history (brows-
ing/wishing/purchasing) with the platform. The accounts lay-
out of the experiment is shown in table I. For 14 consecutive
days at 9am each of the accounts that will browse, add items
to wish list or cart will start performing its assigned activity on
each item in its assigned treatment set. After finishing all their
respective activities, every account will save the homepage in
order to measure the effect of activities and treatments on the
recommendations generated on the homepage (After-Action),
then all accounts pause till 11am. At 11 AM all of the 13
accounts - including the one that solely search - will save
their homepage (Before-Search) and start searching for each
of the 29 queries simultaneously. After searching each query
the account will save the generated SERP of that query and
pause for 20 minute in order to neutralize any carry-over effect.
After searching for all queries, each bot goes to the account
homepage and saves it (After-Search). Fig. 4 shows steps taken
by each account responsible for one of the four activities.
VI. RESULTS
In this section we analyze the data collected during our
audit experiment to answer our research questions listed in
5
section II. We test our data for normality and we find that it
is not normally distributed, also our samples have unequal
sizes. Thus, we choose non-parametric tests. For pairwise
comparisons, we use Mann-Whitney U test. For multiple
comparisons, we use Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA followed by
Tukey HSD for post-hoc analysis. Note that the SERP-MS
score is computed for each SERP, while FSERP-MS score is
computed for each homepage.
A. RQ1:Search Algorithms
In this section, we investigate how items that have a stance
(Pro/Neutral/Anti) toward vaccines’ misinformation get ranked
SERPs and what factors might influence their presence and
ranking. First, we investigate how each of the five ranking
algorithms of Amazon would rank search results with respect
to their stance toward misinformation. Second, we inspect
the effect of a query stance to vaccines misinformation on
the misinformation stance of search results. Last, we examine
the user ratings of items under each misinformation stance to
understand its influence on the prevalence of misinformative
search results.
1) RQ1a: Ranking Algorithms: We compare the rankings of
items under each misinformation stance across the five search
algorithms. We find that items under each stance rank sig-
nificantly different across the five algorithms (Kruskal Wallis
H(4)≈51.6, p≈1.7e-10), Tukey-HSD reveals that both Fea-
tured and Average Customer Review algorithms rank misin-
formative items similarly without significant difference, while
the other three algorithm also have a similar rankings for
misinformative items, see fig. 5. The same hold for neutral
items with (Kruskal Wallis H(4)≈52.18, p≈1.3e-10). On the
other hand, items that are against vaccines misinformation
rank significantly different across all algorithms (Kruskal
Wallis H(4)≈32, p≈1.9e-6), where µAvg. Cust. Review < µfeatured,
µavg. customer review < µprice asc. and µprice desc. < µprice asc.. In
summary, we deduce that the average customers reviews play
a critical role in ranking items by the default (Featured) search
algorithm, therefore we find the rankings of both neutral and
pro misinformative items are similar across both algorithms.
2) RQ1b: Query effect: We analyze the effect of the query
stance on the stance of search results to understand if there is
positive correlation between the query stance and the stance
(SERP-MS Score) of the SERP generated by Amazon. We test
for a significant difference between SERP-MS of three groups
of search queries annotated for either being pro (1), neutral (0)
or anti (-1) misinformation. We find that there is a significant
difference (Kruskal Wallis H(2)≈3623.86, p=0.0) where the
means of pro, neutral and anti misinformation queries are 0.26,
0.128 and -0.627 respectively. We conclude that the stance of a
query positively correlates with the stance of its results, where
pro misinformation queries tend to generate more misinforma-
tive results than neutral queries and neutral queries generate
more misinformative results than anti misinformation queries.
Fig. 6 depicts the frequencies and the variations of SERP-MS
scores resulting from each of the three query stances.
3) RQ1c: User Rating Effect: To investigate the relation-
ship between user rating of an item and its ranking as a
search result or a recommendation given its misinformation
stance, we depict box plots in fig. 7 of: (a) ratings as a
measure of item’s preference, and (b) number of ratings as
a measure of item’s popularity of unique search results and
recommendations. We find that pro misinformation items have
higher ratings than anti misinformation items in both search
results and recommendations. On the other hand, neutral items
(a) Featured (b) Average Customer Review
(c) Price (Ascending) (d) Price (Descending)
(e) Newest Arrivals
Fig. 5: Percentages of items ranked at each of the top 20 positions within each
annotation category (Pro Misinfo (1), Neutral (0) and Anti Misinfo (-1)) for the 5 Amazon
search algorithms: (a) Featured algorithm (default), (b) Average customer review, (c) Item
price ascending, (d) Item price descending and (e) Newest Items added to Amazon
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: (a) Frequency distributions and (b) box plots of the SERP-MS scores for each
of the three query stances (Pro Misinfo (1), Neutral (0) and Anti Misinfo (-1)).
have similar and lower ratings than misinformative items in
search results and recommendations respectively. While for
items popularity, neutral items are more popular than the
other two stances in both search results and recommenda-
tions, while misinformative items are more popular than anti-
misinformation items in both search results and recommenda-
tions.
B. RQ2: User Activity Effect
We investigate the effects of four user activities (search,
browse, add to wish list, add to cart) on the misinformation
scores SERP-MS and FSERP-MS of SERP pages and home-
pages recommendations (After-Search), respectively. For the
collected SERPs, we find no significant difference (Kruskal
Wallis H(3)≈0.66, p≈0.88) between the SERP-MS scores
of accounts that searched after browsing, adding items to
wish list or cart and the account that only searched without
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(a) Search Results (Ratings) (b) Search Results (No. of Ratings)
(c) Recommendations (Ratings) (d) Recommendations (No. of Ratings)
Fig. 7: Ratings and number of ratings of items annotated as one of the three stances
(Pro Misinfo (1), Neutral (0) and Anti Misinfo (-1))
(a) SERP (b) Homepage
Fig. 8: Frequency distributions of (a) SERP-MS and (b) FSERP-MS scores of SERPs
and homepages, respectively, for the four activities (search, browse, add to wish list and
add to cart)
having prior history. We deduce that performing any of those
activities before searching does not affect search results.
While for homepage recommendations, we find a significant
difference (Kruskal Wallis H(3)≈25.65, p≈1.13e-5) between
the FSERP-MS scores after performing the four activities.
We find that only searching without having prior history (i.e
browsing, wishing or purchasing) does no affect the homepage
recommendations at all, whereas the other three activities
affect the homepage recommendations, yet their effects are
not significantly different from each other. The mean FSERP-
MS scores of search, browse, add to list and add to cart are
0.0, 0.163, 0.166 and 0.185, respectively. Figures 8a and 8b
show the frequency distributions of SERP-MS and FSERP-MS
scores across all activities.
C. RQ3: Item Stance Effect
We inspect the effect of the four item stance treatments
(pro-misinformation, anti-misinformation, neutral and a com-
bination of the three previous treatments) on the calculated
misinformation scores SERP-MS and FSERP-MS of the SERP
pages and homepages, respectively. We compare the four
different treatments SERP-MS scores and find no significant
difference (Kruskal Wallis H(3)≈4.5, p≈0.22) between the
SERP-MS scores of the four treatments regardless of the
activity (browsing, wishing or purchasing) done before search.
On the other hand, we find a significant difference (Kruskal
Wallis H(3)≈463, p≈5e-100) between the FSERP-MS scores
of homepage recommendations when applying the four treat-
ments of item stance, where accounts that interact (browse,
(a) SERP (b) Homepage
Fig. 9: Frequency distribution of (a) SERP-MS scores of SERP pages and (b) FSERP-
MS scores of homepages for each of the four treatments (Pro Misinfo (1), Neutral (0),
Anti Misinfo (-1), and a combination (mix) of the three other treatments).
add to wish list or cart) with items that promote misinforma-
tion about vaccines get homepage recommendations that also
promote more vaccines misinformation than those who do the
same activities on the other treatments. We find a positive
correlation between the misinformation stance of items that
are browsed, added to wish list or shopping cart and the
misinformation stance of homepage recommendations after
performing any activity. Figures 9a and 9b show the frequency
distributions of SERP-MS and FSERP-MS scores across all
stance treatments.
VII. DISCUSSION
Search Algorithms. To explore RQ1, we analyze three key
factors that might affect selecting and ranking items as search
results, given that they have stances toward vaccines’ misinfor-
mation. (1) We compare the five available search algorithms on
items rankings, (2) we investigate the effect of the search query
on results with respect to their misinformation stance and (3)
we inspect users’ ratings of items that have misinformation
stance. We observe positive correlations between the selection
and ranking of items that has a misinformation stance (pro,
neutral or anti) and (a) the misinformation stance of search
queries (see VI-A2), (b) the item preference and popularity
based on users’ ratings (see VI-A3) and (c) the average
customer review (see VI-A1). We notice that the overall users’
evaluation of items (ratings and reviews) plays a critical role in
selecting and ranking search results (i.e., the more popular and
preferred an item is the more likely it will be highly ranked
in search results), also the misinformation stance of a search
query positively correlates with the misinformation stance of
search results.
Effect of personalization based on user activity. We
answer RQ2 by investigating the effect of 4 main user activities
– search, browse, add to wish list and add to cart – on
the amount of misinformation present to the user in search
results and recommendation. We conclude that user’s activities
with the platform does not affect the misinformation stance
of search results. However, having a browsing, wishing or
purchasing history with the platform affects the homepage
recommendations similarly, in contrast to solely searching
without having history which has no effect on the homepage
recommendations.
Effect of personalization based on item’s stance. We
answer RQ3 by investigating the effect when a user interacts
with items having misinformation stance – pro, neutral and anti
– on the amount of misinformation present to the user in search
results and recommendations. We find that our hypothesis H3a
is true only for homepage recommendations, which leads to a
misinformative filter bubble on a user’s homepage. In contrast,
the misinformation stance of items being browsed, added to a
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wish list or a shopping cart does not affect the misinformation
stance of search results.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a methodology for auditing
search and recommendation systems for misinformation on
online marketplaces. Our methodology is the first to inspect
how personalization affects the amount of misinformation
presented in search results and recommendations on an online
marketplace. We applied our methodology and audited the
extent of vaccines’ misinformative items on Amazon, and the
effect of personalization based on (a) user activity (search,
browse, add to wish list, add to cart) and (b) misinformation
stance of items (pro, neutral and anti) that the user interacts
with on the misinformation stance of search results and
recommendations. Our study reveals that the misinformation
stance of items selected and ranked by Amazon’s search
algorithms is positively correlated with both the stance of
the search queries and the customers’ evaluation of items
(ratings and reviews), (b) search results are not affected by
any of the users’ activities or the selection of misinformative
items and (c) a misinformative filter bubble forms within the
homepage when a user interacts with items of misinformative
stance through browsing, adding to a wish list or a shop-
ping cart. In conclusion, we believe that Amazon does not
deliberately recommend vaccines’ misinformative items, yet
mitigating vaccines’ misinformation on its marketplace may
be an interesting problem to explore.
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